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This paper considers fluctuations and policy in an eco-
nomicmodelwithmultiplesteadystatesdueto aproduction
externality. In the absence ofpolicy changes, the driving
forces generatingfluctuations are exogenous randompro-
ductivity shocks. However, because there are multiple
steady states, large productivity shocks can shiftthe econ-
omy between high- and low-level equilibria, providing an
additional endogenous source offluctuations. The scope
for macroeconomicpolicy is large since changes in policy
can also shift the economy between equilibria. In this
setting macroeconomic policy exhibits hysteresis (irre-
versibilities) and threshold effects and can be used to
eliminate endogenousfluctuations.
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A relatively recent majorfocus ofmacroeconomic theories
has been on nonlinear. models with multiple self-fulfilling
equilibriaand the potential for "endogenous fluctuations."
This category can be interpreted quite broadly to encom-
pass models with solutions following regular periodic
cycles, "sunspot" solutions depending on extraneous ran-
dom variables, or multiple steady states arising from coor-
dination failures.!
These models may be contrasted with the recent "real
business cycle" theory and more generally with linear
models with exogenous random shocks generating busi-
ness cycles around a unique equilibrium. Such models do
not generate as wide a range of dynamic time series
patterns as is possible in nonlinear models which can
generate asymmetries endogenously and manifest addi-
tionaltypes ofpersistence. Modelswithmultiple equilibria
are also a potential explanation for the empiricalresults
that the economy appears to exhibit regime-switching.2
In the model below we combine aspects of both ap-
proaches. In the absence of policy changes, the driving
forces generating fluctuations are exogenous random pro-
ductivity shocks. Without policy changes or productivity
shocks, the economy would settle down to a nonstochastic
steady state. Clearly productivity shocks will generate
fluctuations around a steady state even if it is unique.
However, for some cases ofthe model below, the economy
has multiple steady states and large shocks can shift the
economybetweenthem. This provides an additional source
of fluctuations which is endogenous in the sense that it
arises from the structure ofthe model.
1. A very limited selection of well-known papers includes Azariadis
(1981), Diamond (1982), Grandmont (1985), Cooper and John (1988),
and Woodford (1990). See also the survey paper by Guesnerie and
Woodford (1991). The endogenous fluctuations in ourmodel are closest
to those described inHowittand McAfee (1992). Their "animalspirits"
cycles are generated by an extraneous sunspot variable, whereas the
fluctuations considered here are generated by intrinsic productivity
shocks. They do not consider the impact of policy, which is\a major
focus ofthis paper.
2. Such results are documented by Hamilton (1989), Boldin (1990) and
Potter (1992). They show that real GNP appears to switch probabilis-
tically between high and low growth regimes.
3The scope for policy in models with multiple equilibria
is potentially large, since the levels ofpolicy variables can
affect the likelihood of the economy being in alternative
equilibria and since changes in policy can shift the econ-
omy between equilibria. This is a fundamental issue for
policy. In linear models there is a continuous map from
control variables to the expected values oftargets. This is
no longer so in these nonlinear models. Although policy
changes within a certainrangehave a continuous response,
beyondsomethresholdtheeconomymay bedisplacedfrom
one equilibrium to another.
In this paperourobjective is to considerthese issues in a
specific model which has multiple stochastic steady state
equilibria arising from an aggregate production exter-
nality. In the model we develop below, the level of eco-
nomic activity in the current period is positively related
to the level expected in the following period. Figure 1
shows the relationship between current and futureaggre-
gate employment, nt = F(nt+ 1) for different values ofthe
policy parameter 'Y ('Y measures government purchases
financed by seignorage, that is, by printing money). The
shape of the curve arises from the positive production
externality: Each agent's productivity is higher when ag-
gregate output is higher. At low n, diminishing returns
yield the usual concave shape to F..Above some thresh-
old the production externality generates increasing social
returns and a steeper slope to F. This leads to the noncon-
cavity shown, though F again becomes concave at suffi-
ciently high n since the magnitude ofthe external effects is
bounded.
FIGURE 1
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There is thus the possibility ofmultiple interior steady
states, shown in Figure 1 for the intermediate 'Y case.
Because the model is forward-looking, the evolution of
the economy is determined in part by the forecast rules
employed by agents, and following recent literature we
assume that forecasting is basedon adaptive learning algo-
rithms. The steady states labeled nL and nH are stable
under adaptive learning, while nu is not. These steady
states can be stochastic in the sense ofthere being fluctua-
tions around them due to productivity shocks. Further-
more, endogenous fluctuations can arise, under certain
learning rules, when productivity shocks are large enough
(andoftherightsign) to move theeconomybetweennL and
nH . These endogenous fluctuations couldbeeliminated by
using policy to shift up F until only the high-level steady
state nH remained.
Adaptivelearning also makes the economy pathdepend-
ent in the sense that the current equilibrium is determined
by initial expectations, the forecast rules, and the shocks.
Insuchenvironmentseconomic policycanexhibithystere-
sis (irreversibilities). Suppose the economy starts at nH
(with intermediate 'Y) as shown in Figure 1. As 'Y is in-
creased nH will decrease and this will be tracked by actual
employment under adaptive learning. When 'Y is large
enough, nH and nu disappear and employment falls to nv
If 'Y is decreased to its original (intermediate) value,
employmentwill only increaseto nL insteadofreturning to
nH • Thus, since a change in policy can move the economy
to a different equilibrium, reversing the policy need not
restore the equilibrium that prevailed before the change.
This paperdevelops in detail the results sketched above.
Section I specifies the model and in Section II we describe
the forecast rules and how they adapt to forecast errors
under learning. Sections III and IV present simulations
which illustrate hysteresis effects and endogenous fluctua-
tions, respectively.
I. THE MODEL
The Basic Overlapping Generations Model
We use a generalization of the overlapping generations
model incorporating a productionexternality, developed in
Evans andHonkapohja(1991), toderivethemodeloutlined
above. 3 The externality leads to social increasing returns
over a certain range so that, for some structural parameter
values, there is the possibility ofmultiple steady states. In
3. For brevity we will subsequently denote the references to our own
work by EH91, EH92a, EH92b, and EH92c.
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productivity shocks and for fiscal-monetary policy.
Before turning to the detailed specification, we empha-
sizethatwewillbeconsideringahighly stylizedmodel. No
attempthas beenmadeinthispapertomakeeitherthe struc-
turalparameters orthe time seriesproperties ofthesolution
paths empirically realistic, though we thillk that the time
series properties for output are "suggestive." Our main
objectives are to show the potential of such models to
exhibit endogenous fluctuations generated by intrinsic
random shocks and to illustrate the effects ofpolicy in this
setting.
In the basic overlapping generations (OG) model rep-
resentative agents (who are producers-consumers) live
two periods. An agent born at time t maximizes utility
W= U(Ct+1) +Z(gpgt+ 1) - Vent), where ct+ 1 is private
consumptionwhen old, nt is laborsupply whenyoung, and
gt is public consumption at t. gt and gt+1 are taken as
exogenously determined by the government. The budget
constraints for the agent are Pt+1Ct+1 =Mt and ptqt=Mp
where Mt is the money stock, qt is the quantity ofoutput
produced, and Pt is the price of output. In the standard
formulation ofthe OG model, one unit of labor produces
one unit ofoutput, that is, qt = nf' but we will modify this
assumptionbelow. Thehouseholdthus works andproduces
output when young, and exchanges the goods producedfor
money (held by the old) at priceP.. This money is then car-
riedforward to the following period whenitis exchanged at
the possibly different price Pt+ 1 for goods to consume
when old. In the standard version of the OG model, the
stock of (fiat) money is held constant and there are no
government purchases.
We chooseto analyze aversion oftheOG modelbecause
it is one of the simplest fully specified dynamic general
equilibrium models in which expectations matter. The
young agent must decide how hard to work, or equiv-
alently, since all income is saved as money, how much to
save when young. Since the rate ofreturn on money (the
only permitted vehicle for saving in the model) is p/Pt+l'
the expected price in the following period, or more accu-
rately the probability distribution ofPt+l' is crucial to the
agent's optimal decision.
Itshould be pointed out that the standard OG model has
the disadvantage that the time unit serves several distinct
purposes: the length ofthe working life, the length of the
retirement, andthe frequency at which economic data are
generated. Clearly, we adopt such a model only for trac-
tability and ease of exposition. In principle there is no
difficulty constructing analogous models with distinct ho-
rizons for these different time periods, as is done in some
empirical models. We anticipate that all the phenomena
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
illustrated in this paper will arise in such more realistic
models.
The Model with Increasing Social Returns
We now introduce two modifications to the standardOG
model. First we allow for government consumption. The
government is assumed to purchase the proportion 'Yt of
output at t, that is, gt='Ytqt. For convenience we assume
that there are no explicit taxes, so that these purchases are
entirely financed by seignorage.4 Thus the government
budget constraint is
Mt+1 = Mt + Pt+1gt+1·
Using ptqt=Mt it follows that
Mt+11Mt = (1-'Yt+1)
and
P/Pt+1 = (1-'Yt+1) qt+1lqr
The other modification concerns the production func-
tion. A positive externality is introduced into production.
Moreover, we allow for random productivity shocks. Thus
the production function is assumed to have the form
(1) qt = f(np Nt)vp
whereNt = Kntis aggregate employment, K is the number
of householillO: in each generation, and Vt is a positive
identically and independently distributed random produc-
tivity shock.
TheNttermrepresents a positive production externality,
and we adopt the particular form developed in EH91:
fen, N) = Ana {max(I*, AN (1 + aAN)-l)}13.
This form arises as follows. Individualoutputisassumed
to depend on "ideas" as well as labor effort. Ideas are
generated (and "broadcast" to other agents) at a rate A.
proportional to labor effort, and the "complementary"
ideas obtained from other agents, beyond some threshold
I~ exert a positive external effect on productivity. This
effect generates increasing returns over a range at the
aggregate level. However, because there is a fixed time
cost, a, for accessing a suitable complementary idea, the
range ofincreasing returns is bounded.
Because 0 < a < 1, the individual faces diminishing
marginal returns to individual labor effort (taking N as
exogenous) andwe adoptacompetitivemodel. Theparam-
eterization ofthe model is completed by assuming the iso-
elastic forms for the utility functions U(c) = c1- ITI(1-IT)
4. Only aminormodificationwould be requiredto allow forusing lump-
sum taxes to raise part ofthe revenue.
5and V(n)=n1+E /(l+E). It can be shown that the law of
motion for the economy satisfies5
(2) El(1-'Yt+1)qt+1)1-rr = n~+E/u.
HereEt denotes theexpectations heldby agents attime t.
In a rational expectations equilibrium this will be equal to
the true conditional expectation at time t.
Since by (1) output next period is given by qt+ 1=
f(nt+1,Knt+1)Vt+1 it can be seen that (2) determines
current employment as a function ofthe expected state of
the economy next period (togetherwiththe currentproduc-
tivity shock this also determines current output and the
price level). That is, the reduced form ofthe model can be
written as
(3) nt = H(EtX(nt+1, Vt+1' 'Yt+1)) ,
where H andX depend on the utility function and produc-
tion technology parameters according to:
(4) X (n, v, "1) = ((1-'Y)f(n, Kn) v)l-rr,
and
on the various parameters, the model canhave 0,1,2, or 3
interior perfect foresight steady states and the number can
be affected by the policy parameter 'Y. Similarresults arise
in the stochastic case with random productivity shocks.
Provided the range ofthe shocks is not too "large,"6 each
ofthe perfect foresight steady states will, in the stochastic
case, correspond to arational (stochastic) steady statent =
jj? and qt=f(fi,Kfi)vt·8
When there are three steady states, the welfare in the
three steady states depends on the value of government
consumption. If government consumption yields no (or
sufficiently low) utility, then steady states with high n
Pareto dominate those with lower n and the nL and nu
steady states represent coordination failures. The inter-
pretation of the multiple steady states is straightforward:
When other agents work hard, this raises the marginal
product of individual effort and induces a higher work
effort. At nL and nu agents work less hard than at nH only
because other agents are working less hard than at nH • It
would be more efficient ifagents could coordinate on the
high effort level nH .
(5) H (X) = UX1/(1+E).
The Effect ofPolicy on Steady States
Multiple Steady States
and Coordination Failures
The economics ofthe model can bemost easily understood
by examining the nonstochastic case in which (1) reduces
to qt= f(npKnt)· Under perfect foresight, (3) relates ntto a
function ofnt+ l' that is, F(nt + 1) = np where we have also
incorporated a constant policy parameter "1t+ 1= "1 into F.
Provided (J'<1 the substitution effect dominates the in-
come effect andfunction F is upward sloping. The S-shape
shown in Figure 1 arises because ofthe production exter-
nality: Below the "kink" point (corresponding to the
thresholdof"free"ideas1*) Fisconcavebecauseofdimin-
ishingreturns. Abovethis pointsocialincreasingreturns set
in, generating a nonconcavity in F. However the region of
increasingsocialreturnsis bounded, andFeventuallyagain
becomes concave.
If the externality is sufficiently strong relative to other
parameters there can be multiple steady states. Depending
5. The first order condition for utility maximization is
EP' (p,q,lp'+l) (p,!p,+,)f, (n" N,) v, = V'(n,),
wherefl (e) is the partial derivative with respect to n. Using the market
clearing conditionP'!P,+1 = (1-'Y,+l) q,+ llq, we obtain
Ep' ( (1-'Y'+l) q,+l) (1-'Yt+ I) q'+1 = V' (n,)f(n" N,) Ih (n" N,).
Substituting the assumed parametric forms for U, V andf(e,e) we ob-
tain (2).
6
An increase in ~i rotates the F function down around the
fixed origin. Figure 1 illustrates one possibility, which we
will focus on in this paper: For "1 sufficiently small, there is
only one interior steady state, the high-level equilibrium
nH . As "1 is increased we at some pointentera regime with
three interiorsteady states, nH , nu, and nL' Finally, when "1
is sufficiently large, only the interior steady state nL
remains.
Recalling thatthe policy parameter "1 represents a mixed
fiscal-monetary policy, it will be noted that, interpreted
as fiscal policy, the effects are anti-Keynesian in the
following sense. As we discuss below, only the steady
states nL and nH are stable under learning. Ifthe economy
is at a stable steady state, for example, nv an increase in "1
lowers the level of steady state employment (and output).
This result is due to a supply side effect. The highermoney
growth required to finance increased government con-
sumption leads to a higher level ofinflation and therefore a
6. Technically suppose that v, has bounded support. Then not "large"
essentially means thatthe lengthofthe supportis sufficiently small. See
EH92a.
7. If the productivity.shock were not proportional, then in a rational
steady state n, itself would be a function ofv,.
8. The model can also have other rational expectations solutions, solu-
tions which depend on exogenous sunspot processes and nonstationary
solutions. Considerationofthese solutions isnotneededfor the analysis
in this paper.
Economic Review / 1993, Number 1lower rate of return on work and saving. Because we
assumethe substitutioneffectdominates the incomeeffect,
this leads to less work effort at higher 'Y.
II. FORECAST RULES AND LEARNING
Expectations andLearning Rules
The possibility ofmultiple rational expectations solutions
(for example, multiple steady states) appears awkward for
the pure rational expectations approach. A now widely
used approach which overcomes the "multiple equilibria"
problem is to replace the assumption of rational expecta-
tions with the specification of a learning rule for expec-
tation formation. 9 This may in any case be a more realistic
view of expectation formation. The model is thus writ-
ten as
(6)
where the superscript e denotes the expectations ofXheld
by the agents at time t on the basis of a forecasting rule
which has been estimated using observed data. 10
This way oflooking at the economy converts a rational
expectations model with multiple equilibria into a model
with path dependence in which the actual evolution of t~e
economy depends on:
(i) the adaptive forecast rules used by the agents,
(ii) the initial parameter estimates and forecasts held by
the agents, and
(iii) the sequenceofstochastic shocks andstructuralshifts.
It may be noted thattypically not all equilibria are stable
outcomes of adaptive learning processes. Requirement of
convergence provides a stability condition which may be
used to select equilibria ofinterest.11
We thus departfrom strict rational expectations, though
for appropriate adaptive forecast rules, expectations may
.converge to rational expectations overtime. Considerfore-
cast rules in which agents treat the law of motion as a
stochastic steady state with an unknown mean. Suppose
agents estimate the unknown population mean using the
sample mean. Such forecast rules are adaptive in the sense
9. See EH92c for a recent review ofthe literature.
10. Note that in considering learning rules we are straining the overlap-
ping generations interpretation ofthe model. Implicitly we are assum-
ing that agents inherit forecast rules from their "parents," which they
then update. Alternatively, itmay be possible to reinterpretthe model in
terms ofinfinitely lived agents facing finance constraints, as "in Wood-
ford (1988).
11. However, more than one equilibrium may be stable under learning;
see below for an example.
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that key parameters are altered in response to forecast
errors.
A convenient way to write this forecast rule is:
(7)
where ~\ = 11tandX8 = Xo' Theformula(7)is thesame as
the conventional adaptive expectations formula,12 except
that the coefficientspecifying the size ofthe revision to the
forecast error, 0t, goes to° atrate lit. This reflects the fact
that each new data point provides proportionately less
information compared to the history of data. 13 0t will be
referred to as the "gain" parameter at time t.
Will this learning rule converge to a rational steady
state? The problem is not straightforward to answer, since
the systemis "self-referential" in the senseusedby Marcet
and Sargent (1989): Agents change their expectations in
response to the evolution ofthe system, and the evolution
ofthe system depends in tum on the expectation rules the
agents use.
For the case at hand it is possible to characterize the
possible asymptotic outcomes when there are three steady
states (see EH92a). The adaptive rule which forecasts X by
means of the average of its past values can lead nt to
convergeto eithernH ornv depending on initialconditions
arId the sequence ofrandom shocks. Thatis, eitherofthese
two rational steady states can be the outcome of an
adaptive learning rule. In contrast, the middle steady state
nu is not stable under learning. When there is only one
steady state it will be stable under learning.14
Structural Change
and Constant Gain Estimators
In the learning rule just described (estimation using the
sample mean), the gain parameter 0t decreases at rate t.
The choice 0t--+O, often referred to as "decreasing gain,"
is appropriate ifagents confidently believe that they are in
an economy in whichXl' the variable being forecasted, has
a constant mean overtime. While this would be reasonable
if agents believe that the structure of the economy never
changes, such an assumption does not seem realistic in
practice.
How should the learning rule be modified if agents
12. We have introducedaone-periodlagintotheexpectationformula (7)
in order to avoid simultaneity between (6) and (7).
13. For an early discussion ofthe adaptive expectations formula with a
possibly nonconstant gain, see Turnovsky (1969).
14. More exotic equilibria, for example, periodic solutions and "sun-
spot" solutions depending on extraneous variables, can be stable under
learning for certain parameter values and appropriate choices oflearn-
ing rules. See EH92a,b for details.
7believe that the structure ofthe economy may be subjectto
change? In the context ofrecursive algorithms for param-
eter estimation, this is a general problem which has been
considered in the statistical andengineering literature; see
Benveniste, etal. (1990, ch. 1and 4, partI). There are two
approaches. The first is for agents to build a model, with
hyperparameters, ofhow the systemis evolving over time,
andto estimate simultaneously bothparameters andhyper-
parameters. This approachrequires knowledge ofthe form
ofstructural change.
The alternative approach, which appears more robust
and which we will adopt in this paper, is to replace the
assumption 0t-t0 by the assumption that 0t is equal to
(or approaches) some fixed value 0>0. This procedure,
known as "constant gain," involves a trade-off between
bias andvariancewhenusedto adaptto anexogenous time-
varying process. A larger value of0 will allow changes in
structure to be tracked more rapidly, but will also produce
more noisy forecasts.
Although the choiceofthe gainparameter0is subjectto
this trade-off, and the optimal choice of 0 will depend on
the size and frequency of structural change, the use of a
constant gain learning rule, in preference to a decreasing
gain rule, is clearly indicated when the structure is subject
to change.
An Example with a Time-Varying Policy
To illustrate the importance ofusing constant gain estima-
tors when structural change is present, consider the behav-
ioroftheeconomyifthe monetary-fiscal policyparameter,
"If' varies systematically over time. In particular, suppose
that the share of government purchases is made to vary
according to:
(8)
Here Uospecifies the meanlevel of'Yf' 2uI is the range over
which "It varies, and w is the frequency.
Agents are assumed not to know the path (8), but to
allow for the structural change by using a constant gain
estimator in (7). Ofcourse, a regular sinusoidal pattern in
"It should be easy to detect, but our point would apply just
as well if the pattern for "It were highly irregular and
difficult to predict.15 In the simulations ofthis section we
15. We are not allowing agents to condition their forecasts ofX, on "{,.
This assumption is justifiable ifthe dataon "{, are infrequent (compared
to d~a on X,) and ofpoor quality. Recent data on X, would then provide
most ofthe information relevant for forecasts.
8
choose Uoand U I so that, given the otherparameters ofthe
model, there is a unique steady state nv 16
The other crucial part of the specification is the distri-
bution of the iid proportional productivity shock v. We
choose
vt = 1 + 'T (0.5 - ut),
where Ut is iid uniform over the unit interval ('T is restricted
to 0 ~ 'T ~ 2). We set 'T = 0.20.
Figure2 shows a simulationover1,000periods whenthe
policy parameters are Uo= 0.07, u l = 0.02, and w= 0.04
andwhen agents use the gain parameter0= 0.15. The path
ofemployment over time reflects the combined effects of
the time variation ofpolicy, random productivity shocks,
and the adaption ofexpectations through thelearning rule.
To see the importance ofusing a constant gain learning
rule rather than a decreasing gain rule (such as averaging,
that is, 0t= lit) we can compare the quality of the fore-
casts. Forconvenience we adopt the mean square forecast
error criterion MSE = T-IIf=I(Xt - Xf)2 and we choose
T = 10,000 periods. Suppose first that agents use a con-
stant gain estimator with 0= 0.15. Then simulations indi-
cate that an individual agent would obtain a much higher
MSE withadecreasing gainestimator(0.0206vs. 0.0149).
Even if all other agents were using a decreasing gain
estimator, a single agentcouldsomewhat lowerhis MSE by
using an appropriate constant gain estimator (for exampie
0=0.05 yields 0.0148 vs 0.0150 with decreasing gain).
Thus with time-varying structure there is a forecasting
advantage in using a constant gain estimator. We discuss
the choice of0=0.15 in the next subsection.
Equilibria in Learning Rules
The pointjustdeveloped merits somefurther discussion. Is
a gain parameter 0 = 0.15 a good choice from a statistical
point ofview? On the basis ofthe data shown in Figure 2,
agents could consider whether another choice of the gain
parameter 0 would have been better in terms ofthe mean
square forecast error,17
(9) MSE(o) = T-fIf=1 (XtC0o) - Xf(O))2.
Equation (9) is interpreted as follows: The data are
generated by the model (4)-(8) with agents using the gain
16. Throughout the paper we use the following structural parameters:
e=0.25, <T=0.1, A=0.0805, a=0.025, a=0.9, >"=0.5, K=40,
/*=19.5,13=1.007.
17. Other possible criteria could be devised based on utility losses.
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parameter 0 = 00 (in our case 00 = 0.15). At the end of T
periods, agents consider whether they have made a good
choice ofthe gain parameter, given the data (that is, given
the choice of the gain parameter 0 = 00 made by other
agents).
Indeed, wecantake this lineofthoughtonestepfurther.
Foreach 00 wecan lookfor the value of0 whichminimizes
(9). Ifthe minimumof(9), given 00 , is attained at 00 itself,
then we have an equilibriumlearning rule with parameter
00 , intheusualsense. No agentwouldwantto alterhis gain
parameter0 (basedontheMSE criterion), giventhe choice
made by others.
We make no attempt to establish the formal existence of
such an equilibrium, but present the evidence for the case
athand, using sample estimates ofthe MSEfor T= 4,000.
Table 1 provides the simulation results. Table 1 shows
MSE(oo) for various values of 00 and also the value of 0,
and corresponding MSE, which minimizes (9) for each
choice of00 , Itcanbe seen that there does appearto be an
equilibriumlearningrule with a gain parameterofapprox-
imately 00 = 0.15. Thisis no accident: We choseourvalue
of 0 on the basis ofTable 1. It is also worth noting that a
wide range of 00 would be "reasonable" choices in the
sense that the MSE loss of using the wrong 0 would be
small.
We close this section with one final point: The "equi-
librium" 0 will depend on the policy parameters. For
example, a higher frequency ofchange w can be expected
to lead to a higher equilibrium value ofo.
Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco
TABLE 1
MSE WITH TIME-VARYING POLICY
ACTUAL MSE ARGMIN MIN DIFFERENCE
80 (80) MSE (8) MSE (8) IN MSE, %
0.01 0.0169 0.07 0.0155 8.89
0.05 0.0149 0.09 0.0146 2.01
0.10 0.0147 0.13 0.0146 0.48
0.15 0.0146 0.15 0.0146 0.00
0.20 0.0147 0.18 0.0147 0.15
0.25 0.0147 0.20 0.0147 0.49
0.30 0.0149 0.23 0.0147 0.85
0.35 0.0150 0.26 0.0148 1.17
0.40 0.0151 0.31 0.0149 1.40
0.45 0.0152 0.36 0.0150 1.53
0.50 0.0154 0.41 0.0151 1.62
0.55 0.0155 0.46 0.0153 1.69
0.60 0.0157 0.51 0.0154 1.74
0.65 0.0158 0.56 0.0156 1.78
0.70 0.0160 0.61 0.0157 1.81
0.75 0.0162 0.66 0.0159 1.84
0.80 0.0163 0.71 0.0160 1.86
0.85 0.0165 0.76 0.0162 1.87
0.90 0.0166 0.81 0.0163 1.89
0.95 0.0168 0.86 0.0165 1.89
NOTE: Table shows MSE for gain 8 when data generated in a model
with time-varying policy and agents use actual gain 00 , Simulations
are over 4,000 periods.
m. HYSTERESIS EFFECTS
Inthe preceding sectionthevariationin 'Yt was restricted to
a range overwhichthe systemhada unique steady statenv
Overthis range, neglectingrandom shocks andtransitional
learning dynamics, there is a continuous relationship be-
tween policy and employment and the policy is "revers-
ible." However, an important feature ofour model is that
certain variations in the policy parameter 'Yt will induce
discontinuous responses. To illustrate this aspectofpolicy
we again investigate the effects ofa time-varying policy of
the form (8), but now set ao=0.04, a l =0.02, and w=
0.01. 'Yt thus varies continuously over the range 0.02 to
0.06. We use a gain parameter of 0 = 0.35, which is
approximately the equilibrium value in the sense of the
preceding section.
Thevalues of'Y = 0.02,0.04, and0.06correspondtothe
"low," "intermediate," and "high" 'Y cases shown in
Figure 1. Consider the effects as policy moves from a low
















0.04. With this value ofthe policy parameterthere are two
stablerational steady states. Ifagents use (7) withdecreas-
ing gain, for example, with 0t = c/t, for some constant c,
then, as pointedoutin SectionII, the systemwillconverge
to oneofthe two rational steady states corresponding tonL
ornH (andexpectations will converge to the corresponding
fixed rational forecast).
However, ifagents use a constantgain 0t= 0>0this will
notbe so-agents' forecasts X'f+ 1willretainsomerandom-
ness even in the limit because oftheir sensitivity (through
0tXt-l)torandomproductivity shocks. Furthermore, there
is now the possibility that, say, with the system starting
nearthe low-level steady state, a large favorable productiv-
ity shock leads to a sufficiently large revision in X'f+ 1 so
that in subsequent periods the system is drawn, for an
extended period oftime, to the high-level steady state.
This phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 4, which pre-
sentstheresultsofa simulationwith0=0.15, "I=0.04and
,.= 0.20 (other parameters are unchanged). The system
appears to alternate between two noisy steady states,
centerednearnH andnL • Occasionallyproductivity shocks
are sufficiently large and in the right direction to move
actual and thus subsequent expected aggregate economic
activity from one region ofattraction to the other.
Why should agents use a constantgainexpectations rule
in this situation? There are two reasons. First, although in
the simulation presented the policy parameter was held
fixed, agents may use a constantgainforecast rule because
they are concerned about the possibility of structural or
policy shifts. Itseems plausible that agents would want to
make some allowance for this by maintaining0 above some
minimum positive level.
Intheforegoing wehave consideredamodel in which akey
drivingforce is variationinthe policyvariable 'Yt. However,
the qualitative results obtained suggest the following addi-
tional possibility. Suppose that agents use a constant gain
forecast rule. Could random productivity shocks lead to
shifts between high-level and low-level steady states, via
induced changes in forecasts, even in the absence of
structuralorpolicyshifts?Aswewillsee, theanswercanbe
yes.
Thus consider the system (4)-(7) with "It fixed at "I =
N ENDOGENOUS CYCLES
Figure 1, estimators will continuously track the mean of
X(nH,v;y) as we move through the low and intermediate "I
cases. However, when "I becomes sufficiently high, nH and
nu coalesce and then disappear. The system bifurcates to
the high "I case, inducing a discontinuous change in the
attracting steady stateemploymentlevel tonL (a "catastro-
phe" phenomenon).
From a policy point of view, some of the more inter-
esting features are the hysteresis effects illustrated in
Figure 3. Here we show the relationship between "It and nt
over one complete cycle of"It (from 0.06 to 0.02 to 0.06).
Over most ofthis range there are two distinct branches to
the policy relationship, with the lower branch correspond-
ing to the nL steady state and the upper branch corre-
sponding to nH'
The branch on which the system lies at some point in
time is determined by history. On a given branch, over a
range of"I, policy is reversible inthe sensethatanincrease
in "I followed by an equal decrease in "I will return the
system to its original position (ifan allowance is made for
random productivity shocks and for transitional learning
dynamics).
However, changes in "It beyond a certain point induce
policy irreversibilities when the system is forced onto the
other branch. Starting with "It = 0.06 and nr=1.9, the sys-
tem moves (clockwise) along the lower branch until at low
values of "It employment becomes forced onto the upper
branch (when the low steady state disappears). When "It
begins to increase from its minimumof0.02, itremains on
the upper branch until "It is sufficiently high.
The message for policy is this: Ifthe system is trapped
into a low-level steady state, the policy variable can have a
strongly nonlinear response. Decreases in 'Y may have
initially small effects on employment, while beyond some
thresholdvalue the inducedresponse canbemuchlargeras
the economy is pushed from the low-level to the high-level
steady state.
Endogenous Shifts in Expectations
10 Economic Review / 1993, Number 1FIGURE 4
ENDOGENOUS CYCLES












o 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000
.Period
Second, andmore fundamental, the choiceofa constant
gainlearningrulemaybeanequilibriumlearningruleinthe
sense defined in SectionII. Thatis, the choice 0 minimizes
the forecast mean square error for each agent, given that
other agents use that o. In this case we would have a self-
fulfilling prophecy in learning rules, with expectations
adapting to fluctuations in economic activity, and the
changes in expectations in turn inducing fluctuations in
the economy. Even if0 is not strictly an equilibrium value,
it may still yield an MSE which is nearly optimal. Table 2
shows that this is indeed true for 0= 0.15)8
Although the model is highly stylized, the results ofthis
section are attractive as a model ofeconomic fluctuations
in the following sense: Unlike "sunspot" equilibria, in
which the solution depends on extraneous variables, the
precipitating variables here, as in real business cycle
(RBC) models, are productivity shocks. The difference
from RBC models is that a sequence of large shocks can
induce a self-fulfilling overreaction in which the economy
moves between its two stable steady states.
Thepolicyimplicationsare again straightforward. Faced
with aneconomy undergoing endogenous fluctuations, the
policyparameter 'Y canbeshiftedto alevel atwhichthereis
a unique steady state.
18. The choice of So=0.15 is only approximately an equilibrium,
because the S that minimizes MSE for this So lies between 0.14 and
0.15.
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NOTE: The MSE for a model with endogenous cycles was generated
by a fixed policy parameter 'Y = 0.04 and constant gain So= 0.15.
Simulations are over 4,000 periods.
Regime-Switching Models
But would agents stick with a constant gain estimator if
they observe the process shown in Figure 4? They might,
since the existence oftwo regimes may not be apparent in
the presence ofthe random shocks, and since the use of a
constant gain estimator is designed to allow for and adapt
tounspecified structural shifts. However, itis ofinterest to
know whether endogenous cycles would continue to exist
if agents did infer the existence of two regimes (corre-
sponding to nL and nH ) and estimated a regime-switching
model in an attempt to improve their forecasts.
Thus suppose that agents··believe that the conditional
mean level ofX follows a two-state Markov process. We
will assume that agents believe the regime is triggered by
the recentaverage level ofeconomic activity, rather than by
some hidden variable, and so use the "self-exciting"
framework ofPotter (1992). Basedon Figure 4, we choose
a regime switching parameterX* corresponding to n = 2.1
(X* = 2.1(l+ €)/a). Agents assume that the economy is in
state 1 ifXt _ 1" the average ofX ofthe recent past, is less
than x* and in state 2 if it exceeds X'}' We again use
a recursive estimation procedure, but now assume that
agents estimate both the conditional mean value ofX in
each state and the conditional probability ofbeing in each
state. LetPi for i = 1,2 bethe probability, given that we are
in state i at s, of staying in state i at s+1. Pi at time t is
essentially estimated by the corresponding actual propor-
tionPitthrough time t. 19 The conditionalmeans in the two
19. The estimation is actually done using the associated recursive
formula and initial estimates PI = P2 = 1.
11states are estimated by
Xlt+l = Xlt + o(Xt-Xlt)
ifXt > X*
For simplicity, the switch pointx* is fixed exogenously
and not estimated. In the simulations we assume thatX t is
computedusing the average over the last three periods. We
continue to use aconstantgainestimator,20onthe assump-
tion that agents still want to allow for the possibility of
structural/policy shifts.
Agents then forecast Xt + 1 at time t according to
Xi+ 1 = PI, tXlt + (1-PI, t) X2t ifXt- l ,;; X*,
and
Xi+l = (1-Pl, t) Xlt + P2, tX2t ifXt _ l > X*.
Figure 5 shows the results of a simulation (over 2,000
periods) with unchanged structural parameters and with
the same values for'Y and O. It is apparent that the broad
pattern of endogenous cycles remains. The main effect of
the "more sophisticated" forecast procedure is to speed
up the transition between regimes.
There are numerous other ways in which agents might
attempt to capture the dynamics of the system, but the
broad point seems clear. Ifagents allow for the possibility
of changes in regime when making their forecasts, this
reinforces the potential of productivity shocks and other
sources ofintrinsic noise to induce, periodically, large self-
fulfilling changes in the level ofeconomic activity.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have considered a macroeconomic model, incorpo-
rating production externalities and random productivity
shocks, which has the potential to generate two stable
stochastic steadystates. Forthe structuralparametervalues
chosen, the number ofstable steady states depends on the
monetary-fiscal policy parameter 'Y. When 'Y is low
(high), only the high- (low-) level steady state exists. Both
steady states coexist for intermediate values of 'Y.
If 'Yt varies sufficiently over time, and if agents use
20.Ifagents use adecreasinggainestimator, the systemmightconverge
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adaptive forecasts with an appropriate constant gain
parameter, aggregate economic activity will periodically
shift between the high-level and low-level regimes. The
economy will exhibit hysteresis effects over the "business
cycle" in the response ofoutput to policy. Ifinstead 'Yt is
held fixed at an intermediate value, the economy can still
exhibit fluctuations bet\veen the t,vo regimes, driven no\v
by the productivity shocks themselves.
There is thus the potential for models with multiple
steady states to explain the empirical regime-switching
results documented by Hamilton (1989), Boldin (1990) and
Potter (1992).21
In our model the "switches" are determined by funda-
mentals, either by intrinsic productivity or taste shocks or
by policychanges. We emphasize, however, thatno attempt
has been made in this paper to use empirically realistic
parameters or to fit macroeconomic data.22 A large gap
currently exists betweentheoretical models ofendogenous
fluctuations and their empirical implementation, and it
may bedesirable to attemptcalibrationto observedfluctua-
tions in future research.
We have emphasized the possibilitythat policymay have
a highly nonlinear response in these models, since it can
sometimes shift the economy between high-level and low-
level steady states if the policy variable exceeds some
threshold. This is clearly an important phenomenon and
indicates that it would be worthwhile to examine the
performance ofmonetary feedback rules in such models.
21. Howitt and McAfee (1992) and Boldin (1990) have also noted this
potential connection.
22. A wider range ofpolicy variables also could be incorporated.
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